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1. Introduction
The issue of how monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy remains far from 
being resolved, although some major theoretical and empirical progress has been made 
recently.1 For a long time, most economists did not assign any active role to banks in 
the transmission of monetary policy. The bank lending channel theory has altered this 
view, predicting that real economic effects of a monetary tightening are amplified by 
small banks with weak liquidity positions. When the market for bank debt is imperfect, 
these banks have to cut their loan supply after a monetary tightening. The empirical 
evidence for the United States indeed shows this pattern (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). But 
the evidence is at best mixed for Europe in general (Angeloni et al., 2003) and Germany 
in particular (Worms, 2003).
The difference in the way German and US banks react to changes in monetary 
policy is related to the structure of the banking system. More than two thirds of German 
banks are organized in liquidity networks. When the central bank tightens monetary 
policy, large head institutions inject liquidity into the system, thereby countervailing 
restrictive effects (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004). Furthermore, a major part of German 
banks is owned by local authorities and all their liabilities were guaranteed by the 
government until July 2005. Hence, they faced, at most, lax refinancing constraints.
Recently, a new strand of the literature has given a prominent role to banks and their 
regulatory capital buffers in monetary policy transmission, even under a frictionless 
market for bank debt. The bank capital channel theory predicts that banks that are 
subject to capital regulation may cut their loan supply after a monetary tightening in an 
1 For a quite broad but somewhat outdated overview, see Symposium on the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism, Mishkin (1995). For European evidence, see Angeloni et al. (2003).
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imperfect market for bank equity (Van den Heuvel, 2002b, 2003). So far, there is no 
microeconometric evidence on this issue for Germany.2
Our paper tests for the existence of the bank capital channel, taking into account the 
specific features of the German banking system. The idea is that banks try to avoid the 
cost of falling below the regulatory minimum capital requirements by holding capital 
buffers and asset buffers, i.e. short-term risk-weighted assets (other than customer 
loans) that can be liquidated if the bank has trouble complying with the capital 
requirement. A monetary tightening leads to costs for banks, with a time-to-maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities. Hence, if these banks additionally have low 
asset and capital buffers, they are expected to react more restrictively, as for them, the 
expected value of the costs of violating the capital regulation increases. 
These hypotheses are tested using regulatory bank-level data on German banks. We 
find evidence that a bank capital channel exists. Banks with a low regulatory capital 
buffer and a low asset buffer react more restrictively after a monetary tightening than 
the average bank.
With respect to the effect of macroeconomic variables on bank lending, we find that 
a monetary tightening (GDP growth) has the expected negative (positive) effect on bank 
lending. Further, banks are found to lend less in times of volatile interest rates. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
literature on the bank capital channel and derives hypotheses. Section 3 presents the 
empirical model and the econometric methods. Section 4 gives the empirical results, 
and Section 5 concludes.
2 For macroeconometric evidence, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2005).
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2. Related Literature and Theoretical Hypotheses
According to the bank lending channel theory, monetary policy affects the supply of 
intermediated credit, particularly bank loans, and is active through an imperfect market 
for bank debt. A restrictive monetary policy leads to a drop of banks’ reservable and 
typically insured deposits. Only banks that have a larger share of liquid assets or that are 
bigger are able to shield their lending relationships. The former can draw on their liquid 
assets, whereas the latter have better access to external finance due to their size. Hence, 
they do not have to curb their lending as sharply as their small or less liquid peers (see 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The same may be true for banks with a bigger capital-to-
assets ratio: Market participants may perceive highly capitalized banks as being less 
risky (Kishan and Opiela, 2000). Consequently, it should be more expensive for poorly 
capitalized banks to finance externally. If debtors do not have perfect substitutes for 
loans, banks’ restrictive lending behaviour constitutes a cost to them. As a consequence, 
the bank lending channel theory predicts a real economic effect in addition to 
conventional channels, which would not exist under a perfect market for debt.
Empirically, banks with a lower ratio of cash and securities (i.e. liquidity) to total 
assets react more restrictively to a tightening of monetary policy in the United States 
(Kashyap and Stein, 2000). The result is attributable to small banks and thus provides 
evidence in favour of the bank lending channel theory.3 The evidence for Europe is 
somewhat mixed and depends very much on the structure of the national banking 
system.4 Worms (2003) concluded in an empirical study for Germany that small banks 
with low liquidity do not necessarily react more restrictively to a monetary policy 
tightening than their peers. However, banks reduce lending more sharply the lower their 
ratio of short-term interbank liquidity to total assets. A reaction along the lines of the 
3 The result was recently challenged by Baum et al. (2004a). They write that the described pattern is 
much weaker and thus economically potentially not as relevant when taking market volatility into 
account. For a theoretical explanation, see Baum (2004b).
4 For a summary of the most recent results, see Angeloni et al. (2003).
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traditional bank lending channel based on the size criterion can only be found when 
controlling for the influence of interbank liquidity. Ehrmann and Worms (2004) show in 
a related paper that German savings banks and credit cooperatives use their head 
institutions for liquidity management: The head institutions accept short-term deposits 
from the local banks and provide longer-term loans in return. As a consequence, criteria 
such as the size of a bank, which would lead to an asymmetric reaction in a banking 
system without liquidity networks, are partially undone in the German banking system.
In addition, local savings banks and credit cooperatives may not be subject to 
significantly different costs of finance.5 As mentioned, most local German banks use 
their head institutions for liquidity management. Even without sufficient short-term 
deposits at their head institutions, they can re-finance with similar conditions at their 
head institutions and are thus not subject to a lemon’s premium incurred by market 
participants. This is amplified by the fact that local savings banks and their head 
institutions enjoyed government guarantees until July 2005 (“Gewährträgerhaftung”).6
Besides, for the majority of credit cooperatives and savings banks, the amount of 
customer deposits is bigger than the amount of overall loans. From 1999 to 2004, this 
was the case for about 80% of the credit cooperatives and for about 60% of the savings 
banks in our sample.7 Thus, these banks have no need for external finance.
In the light of the two aforementioned phenomena, the empirical finding by 
Worms (2003) that interbank liquidity matters a lot in Germany seems to be puzzling.
But the bank capital channel theory recently developed by Van den Heuvel (2002b, 
2003) may shed more light on the issue why different levels of interbank liquidity may 
5 For the bank lending channel to be operative, differences in the costs of finance depending on bank-
specific criteria, however, are necessary in the theoretical model developed by Ehrmann et al. 
(2003), which was used for a number of empirical studies.
6 Their owners (cities, municipalities, rural districts for savings banks and states plus the local savings 
banks for the head institutions) guaranteed all liabilities. Thus, in the past, all institutes in the 
savings bank sector enjoyed the status of a de facto AAA rating (although most of them were not 
officially rated), and there was no default risk for non-insured liabilities.
7 Measured as time periods when banks had more customer deposits than customer loans.
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play a role, although banks with guaranteed liabilities may not face different costs of re-
finance and although most of the local banks face a higher level of deposits than 
customer loans. The bank capital channel is active through an imperfect market for bank 
equity. A restrictive monetary policy directly affects banks via maturity transformation 
costs, since they typically have a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities.8 As 
a consequence, after a monetary tightening, banks incur losses or make smaller-than-
expected profits, affecting their capital. Since it is costly (or almost impossible for most 
German banks) to raise new equity, banks that are poorly capitalized will have to cut 
lending to keep an adequate regulatory capital buffer and to reduce the risk of violating 
the capital requirements.9 There are three necessary conditions for the bank capital 
channel to be operative: an imperfect market for bank equity, a maturity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities exposing banks to interest rate risks, and the existence of 
minimum capital requirements. All of these conditions are fulfilled in Germany. First of 
all, locally organized banks are owned either by government institutions or by their 
members. Hence, it is very difficult for them to raise new equity. Second, descriptive 
statistics show that German banks perform maturity transformation (see Merkl and 
Stolz, 2006). Finally, all German banks are subject to minimum capital requirements.
Van den Heuvel (2002a) presents indirect evidence that the bank capital channel 
exists in the United States. When a state’s banking sector starts out with a low capital-
to-assets ratio, its subsequent output growth is more sensitive to changes to the 
monetary policy indicator.
Without using regulatory data, it is not clear a priori whether a more restrictive 
reaction of banks after a monetary tightening is driven by higher costs of finance or by 
8 Loans typically have a longer time to maturity than deposits. Maturity transformation is regarded as 
one of the main functions of a bank (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet, 2004).
9 According to Basel I, 8% of the loan volume has to be held as capital (there are exceptions for 
government and other specific loans). A violation of the minimum capital requirement may have 
serious consequences, such as being taken under the control of the domestic supervisors or even 
being closed down.
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the risk of violating the capital requirement. Hence, three studies on European countries 
(Austria, Italy, and Switzerland) use regulatory data. They do, in fact, find evidence 
supporting the bank capital channel, as banks with lower regulatory capital buffers10
are found to react more restrictively to a monetary tightening (Engler et al., 2005; 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Bichsel and Perrez, 2005).11
There is no microeconometric study for Germany so far that uses regulatory capital 
to analyze the transmission of monetary policy. This paper tries to fill the gap. Other 
than the aforementioned empirical studies on the bank capital channel, we do not only 
focus on regulat ry capital, but also on its interaction with the short-run interbank 
assets. We hypothesize that banks that h old a large amount of short-run interbank assets
face a lower risk of falling below the capital requirements, as these assets will be 
liquidity soon and, thus, the regulatory capital requirement will decrease.
3. The Empirical Model and Methods
In this section, we describe our empirical approach. First, we derive our estimation 
equation and the hypothesis to be tested later in the paper. We subsequently discuss the 
employed econometric methods.
3.1. Empirical Model
Van den Heuvel (2003) develops a dynamic model that shows that banks’ lending 
response to monetary policy depends on their capital structure. He illustrates in a 
calibrated model that monetary policy can change the supply of bank loans through its 
impact on bank equity. However, his model is not suited to derive a reduced form for 
the reaction of banks to monetary policy depending on their bank-specific criteria and of 
10 Some other studies use “excess capital” synonymously for “capital buffer.”
11 Engler et al. (2005) interpret this result in the context of the traditional bank lending channel, since 
they cannot find any evidence that Austrian savings banks and credit cooperatives perform 
significant maturity transformation.
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course does not take into account certain special features of the German banking 
system, such as liquidity networks.
Hence, in order to test the bank capital channel, we extend the standard model used 
in the empirical literature (see, for instance, Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2004, and Worms, 2003). Our baseline model has the following dynamic 
reduced form structure (for a theoretical derivation see Merkl and Stolz, 2006):
4
1 1 1
1
4 4
1 1
4
1
ln lnit j it j it it it
j
j it j t j j it j it j t j
j j
j it j it j t j j it j
j
Loans Loans Capital Buffer Asset Buffer Risk
Rho MP Capital Buffer Rho MP
Asset Buffer Rho MP Capital Buffer Asset Bu
   
 
 
	 	 	 	
=
	 	 	 	 	
= =
	 	 	 	
=
 =  + + + +
+  +  +
+  +

 
 4
1
it j it j t j
j
t it
ffer Rho MP
TimeDummies u
	 	 	
=
 +
+ +


(1)
where  is the first-difference operator, Loans denotes domestic customer loans (loans 
to government institutions and financial institutions excluded),12 MP denotes the 
monetary policy indicator, and Risk denotes asset risk. Rho is a proxy for the cost a 
bank incurs when facing a one-percentage-point increase in the monetary policy 
indicator. Hence, Rho*MP is a proxy for the maturity transformation costs. i and t
refer to the bank and time dimension, respectively. For the variables Capital Buffer, 
Asset Buffer and Risk, the period mean of the respective pillar (savings banks, 
cooperative banks) is deducted. See Appendix for more details.
The intuition behind our specification is the following: Banks are monopolistic 
competitors which choose an optimal combination of loan interest rate and loan supply, 
taking the expected costs of falling below the capital requirement and of re-financing 
into account. Even if banks are not subject to different costs of finance, as in the bank 
12 The change in loans is an approximation for newly issued loans.
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9
lending channel theory,13 monetary policy can lead to an asymmetric reaction as 
predicted by the bank capital channel literature. If a bank faces maturity transformation 
costs due to an increase in the market interest rate, the risk of violating the capital 
requirement increases, especially if it is short on its asset and capital buffer. The more 
short-term risk-weighted assets (other than customer loans) the bank holds on its 
balance sheet (i.e. the higher the bank’s asset buffer), the lower the risk of violating the 
capital requirements will be: The short-term risk-weighted assets will soon be liquid, 
thereby reducing the capital requirement in the near future. Also, the higher the bank’s 
capital buffer, the lower the risk of violating the capital requirement will be. If the asset 
and capital buffer are not sufficiently high, given maturity transformation costs the bank 
faces a higher risk of violating the capital regulation after a monetary tightening. Thus, 
it may decide to cut its loan supply by more than its peers in order to restore adequate 
capital and asset buffers. Even if banks are not pure profit maximisers, they will weigh 
the risk of violating the capital requirements against other objectives, such as 
relationship banking. For the formalization of the intuition in a model see Merkl and 
Stolz (2006, p 32 f.).
We consider the double interaction of the asset and capital buffer as very important, 
since it captures the interaction between both variables, i.e. it conditions one on the 
other. Intuitively, a bank should be very cautious if it is low on both types of buffers, 
whereas having either a significantly high asset or capital buffer may reduce the risk of 
violating the capital requirements significantly.
We use short-term interbank assets (“interbank liquidity”) with a maturity up to one 
year as our measure for the asset buffer. A high interbank liquidity position reduces the
13 In the baseline regression we omit the bank lending channel option. In a robustness check (see 
Merkl and Stolz, 2006), we assume that the amount of inflowing deposits is driven by the stance of 
monetary policy to incorporate the features of the bank lending channel into the model. As a 
consequence, monetary policy can be transmitted via the head institution of the liquidity network of 
banks.
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future regulatory capital requirement. It is also well known from the literature that 
German banks which are organized in liquidity networks use this position for liquidity 
and maturity transformation management (Ehrmann and Worms, 2004). 
As we do not know the right set of macro variables in advance and as there is always 
the danger of not capturing the time effects properly and thus obtaining seriously biased 
coefficients for the micro variables, we use the full set of time dummies in the baseline 
regression. This comes at the price that we do not know how  the average bank will react 
to interest rate changes and other macro variables. To overcome this problem, we 
experiment later to find out which set of macro variables leads to similar estimated 
coefficients for the micro variables. 
We add the asset and capital buffer as level terms to keep our estimated specification 
as general as possible and to prevent an omitted variables bias. For expositional 
simplicity, we do not show the full (short-term) dynamics when giving the regression 
results in Section 4 but instead confine ourselves to showing the “long-term” 
coefficients.14
Taking as the null hypothesis that German banks do not react along the lines of the 
bank capital channel, we can state our hypothesis in terms of the coefficients  ,  and
 as follows:15
H1:  >0, or  >0, or  <0
14 For instance, we calculate the “long-term” coefficient  using the following formula 
4 4
1 1
/(1 )j j
j j
  
= =
= 	 
. 
The other “long-term” coefficients are calculated accordingly.
15 Please note that Capital Buffer and Asset Buffer are corrected for the mean and, hence, take on 
negative values for banks with low buffers (see Appendix A for details).
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We expect banks with a lower capital buffer to react more restrictively if they face 
maturity transformation costs ( >0) caused by a monetary tightening. Similarly, we 
expect the same for banks with a lower asset buffer ( >0). Finally, we expect that 
banks that are weak in both categories are at a disproportionately high risk of running 
into trouble with the capital regulation. We therefore expect them to react much more 
restrictively ( <0). For the capital channel to be at work, at least one of these three 
estimated long-term coefficients has to show the expected significant sign and none of 
the other coefficients may show an unexpected significant sign. For the double 
interaction term (<0), it is important to know whether it is driven by banks with low or 
high capital and asset buffers. The latter would lead to the counterintuitive result that 
banks with high asset and capital buffers react more restrictively to a monetary 
tightening than their peers. This will be analyzed in a robustness check.
3.2 Econometric Approach
Given equation (1), we employ dynamic panel data techniques that control for the bank-
specific effects iµ . We take the first difference of the model specified in equation (1) in 
order to eliminate the individual effect iµ , and we try to find suitable instruments for 
the lagged endogenous variable. Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimator that uses the entire set of lagged values of the 
endogenous variable as instruments. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) show that additional moment conditions are valid if the autoregressive 
process is mean-stationary: then, first differences of the endogenous variable are 
uncorrelated with the individual effect iµ  and can thus be used as instruments for 
equations in levels. In order to obtain the efficient GMM estimator, both sets of moment 
conditions have to be combined to obtain the “system GMM estimator” proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Given the potential endogeneity of the other bank-specific 
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variables, Capital Buffer and Asset Buffer, we also include GMM-style instruments for 
these variables. We only use a sub-sample of the whole history of the series as 
instruments in the later cross-section. To determine the optimal lag length of the 
instruments, we use the Hansen test as the specification criterion (Andrews and 
Lu, 2001).
As, for our sample, the one- and two-step Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator 
produce quite similar estimates, we present only the (asymptotically) more efficient 
two-step estimates. However, the two-step estimates of the standard errors tend to be 
severely downward biased (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998). To 
compensate, we use the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix 
derived by Windmeijer (2005).16
4. Empirical Results
Our dataset consists of quarterly bank-level confidential supervisory data on German 
universal banks (commercial banks, savings banks with their central giro institutions, 
and credit cooperatives with their central giro institutions) for the time period 1999:03 
to 2004:12 (following the establishment of the European Monetary Union). The variable 
definition and the treatment of outliers and mergers are described in full detail in Merkl 
and Stolz (2006).
In the following subsections, we first present the results of estimating equation (1). 
We then give additional evidence that the results are indeed in line with the capital 
channel. Finally, we show that our results may also be economically significant.
4.1 Asymmetrical Reaction of Monetary Policy
Baseline Regression
16 In Merkl and Stolz (2006) the estimation results from a fixed effects specification are shown and 
deliver the same qualitative outcome.
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Table 1 shows the long-term coefficients obtained from estimating equation (1) and the 
specification tests (Hansen test and the tests of serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals).
First, in the baseline regression with time dummies, neither the capital buffer nor the 
interbank liquidity shows a significant influence on the average loan growth in our 
sample. Yet, the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of Interbank Liquidity and
Maturity Transformation Costs is found to be significant and positive, while the 
interaction term between Capital Buffer and Maturity Transformation Costs is found to 
be insignificant. This means that banks with below-average interbank liquidity react in a 
more strongly negative way to a monetary tightening than their average peers, which 
gives support to hypothesis H1.
Second, the interaction term between Capital Buffer, Interbank Liquidity, and
Maturity Transformation Costs is found to be significant and negative. This finding 
indicates that banks with both a low capital buffer and low interbank liquidity react 
more restrictively to an increase in the interest rate than their peers which have, for 
instance, only a low interbank liquidity, thus giving support to hypothesis H1: The lower 
the capital buffer and the interbank liquidity, the higher the risk they face of violating 
the capital requirements. As a consequence, banks with a low capital buffer and low 
interbank liquidity act more restrictively than their average peers when they face 
maturity transformation costs after a monetary tightening.
-- Table 1 about here --
The estimated coefficient for Maturity Transformation Costs is insignificant in 
Specifications (1) and (2), indicating that banks do not react to maturity transformation 
costs as such, but only in interaction with the asset and capital buffer. This result is in 
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line with our theoretical setting. Although maturity transformation costs reduce the 
current profit of a bank, they are sunk costs. Their current magnitude is determined by 
the term structure of assets and liabilities one period before, which cannot be affected 
by the contemporary loan policy. Thus, banks only react more restrictively to maturity 
transformation costs if they belong to the group of poorly capitalized and low liquidized 
banks.
The baseline regression furthermore shows that, higher Risk leads to a significant 
decrease in loan growth: As increasing credit risk increases the need to build up capital 
buffers, banks with a more risky loan portfolio have a slower loan growth.
Robustness Checks
We run several robustness checks. First, we use the quarterly changes of the Euribor and 
the real GDP growth rate instead of the full set of time dummies. We obtain similar 
results for the interaction term of Capital Buffer, Interbank Liquidity and Maturity 
Transformation Cost. But the significant coefficient for the interaction term of 
Interbank Liquidity and Maturity Transformation Costs cannot be replicated. As 
expected, lending depends positively on real GDP growth. The estimated coefficient for 
interest rate changes is negative, but surprisingly not significant.
Second, as described, the sign of the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of 
Capital Buffer, Interbank Liquidity and Maturity Transformation Costs was found to be 
negative. This finding indicates that poorly capitalized banks with low asset buffers 
react more restrictively to an increase in the interest rate. Yet, this finding may also 
indicate that highly capitalized banks with an above-average asset buffer react more 
restrictively to an increase in the interest rate. This last effect would clearly be 
counterintuitive.
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Hence, in order to see whether the significant negative coefficient is driven by banks 
with high or low capital buffers, we define dummy variables that capture the 
capitalization of banks. We assign one dummy to banks that are, on average, below the 
50th percentile of excess capitalization (Low) and one dummy to those banks above this 
threshold (High).17 Each dummy is multiplied by the interaction term of interbank 
liquidity and maturity transformation costs. This allows us to disentangle the effects in 
the baseline specification and to assign them to poorly and well capitalized banks. We 
are aware that the threshold is arbitrary and therefore check to see whether the results 
depend on the ch sen threshold.18
4
1 1 1 1 1
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4 4
1 2
1 1
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1 2
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(2)
Table 2 shows the regression results for equation (2). Like the baseline regression, 
higher Risk is found to lead to a significant decrease in loan growth. Further, the 
interaction term between Interbank Liquidity and Maturity Transformation Costs
corresponds to the interaction term between Capital Buffer, Interbank Liquidity, and
Maturity Transformation Costs in the baseline specification shown in table 1. The 
regression results show that the interaction term between Interbank Liquidity and
17 Without previously normalizing excess capital to zero, the sample split for credit cooperatives and 
savings banks delivers similar results.
18 To check for robustness, we validated all results obtained from the dummy approach by using an 
equivalent sample split for poorly and highly capitalized banks, which is somewhat less restrictive 
with respect to the imposed dynamics (for instance, not assigning the same estimated coefficients 
for the lagged dependent variable for both types of banks). Since this approach leads to the same 
conclusions, we do not show the estimated coefficients.
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Maturity Transformation Costs is significant and positive only for poorly capitalized 
banks and insignificant for well capitalized banks. Hence, poorly capitalized banks react 
more restrictively to an increase in maturity transformation costs if they have below-
average interbank liquidity.
However, the reaction of highly capitalized banks to a change in the interest rate 
does not depend on interbank liquidity. Again, these findings support the hypothesis 
that the asset buffer plays an important role in interaction with the capital buffer, 
namely for poorly capitalized banks.
As a further robustness check, we run the same exercise and assign one dummy to 
the lowest capitalized 25% of banks, one to banks capitalized within the 25% to 75% 
range, and a third to the highest capitalized 25% of banks. The estimated coefficient for 
the lowest capitalized banks is positive and significant at the 5% level, while banks in 
the middle range show a positive, albeit insignificant sign, and the best capitalized 
banks a negative and insignificant sign. This confirms that the asymmetry is driven by 
the lowest capitalized banks in interaction with their interbank liquidity.
If we replace the time dummy specification with a set of macro variables, the 
quarterly changes in the Euribor and the real growth rate of GDP, we obtain the same 
qualitative results for the interaction terms, thus confirming the aforementioned 
hypotheses. As expected, the reaction to real GDP growth is highly significant and 
positive, thus capturing loan demand effects. As in the baseline specification, the 
estimated long-run coefficient for interest rate changes is insignificant.
However, the implausible insignificance of MP disappears if we include a 
volatility measure for the monetary policy indicator (calculated based on daily data) into 
the regression, as suggested by Baum (2004a, b). As a consequence, the estimated 
coefficient for MP gains significance and increases in magnitude. The latter also holds 
for the estimated GDP coefficient. The volatility measure itself is found to be highly 
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significant and negative, indicating that higher interest rate volatility results in lower 
lending activity on average. The big changes in the estimated coefficients for the other 
two macroeconomic variables show that specification (2), which only includes real 
GDP growth and interest rate changes instead of the full set of time dummies, suffers 
from an omitted variable bias.
Baum et al. (2004b) argue that banks behave more homogenously during times of 
greater macroeconomic uncertainty, since macroeconomic volatility prevents them from 
foreseeing investment opportunities. The inclusion of macroeconomic volatility by 
Baum et al. (2004a) weakens the results in favour of the bank lending channel, which 
was assembled by Kashyap and Stein (2000) for the United States.
Unlike in Baum (2004a), the finding that banks react asymmetrically to interest rate 
changes (expressed by the interaction terms of Interbank Liquidity and Maturity 
Transformation Costs) remains unaffected by the inclusion of the volatility measure. 
The estimated coefficient for the interaction term remains similar, whereas the 
magnitude and significance level even increase somewhat in the Blundell-Bond 
estimation. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of Volatility
and Interbank Liquidity is insignificant.
Thus, interestingly, German banks do not seem to be affected by Baum’s critique 
that the result of an asymmetric reaction of banks to monetary policy is weakened or 
even undone by including second moments. We hypothesize that his point may be more 
relevant to the bank lending channel than to the bank capital channel. We expect poorly 
capitalized banks to act more cautiously if they cannot foresee investment opportunities 
properly.
All in all, the dummy approach underlines the hypothesis that banks with a low 
capital buffer and a low interbank liquidity react more restrictively to monetary policy 
than the average bank.
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-- Table 2 about here --
4.2 Maturity Transformation Costs and Firms’ Profits
In this subsection, we analyze whether maturity transformation costs, as defined by our 
proxy, are able to influence the interest income of banks significantly. This is an 
important precondition for the bank capital channel to be active. The bank capital 
channel theory argues that a monetary tightening reduces bank profits, as banks face 
maturity transformation costs. Thus, poorly capitalized banks have to reduce lending, as 
they see their capital position deteriorating even further or are not able to re-establish a 
sustainable capital buffer. Hence, a necessary precondition for the bank capital channel 
to be at work is deteriorating profits after a monetary tightening. We test this 
precondition by regressing banks’ interest income on their maturity transformation 
costs. As interest income is available only on a yearly basis, we use a yearly dataset in 
this subsection (see table 3 for results).
Specification 1 shows that maturity transformation costs have a highly significant 
effect on interest income. As we do not include control variables other than time 
dummies, it is particularly important to rule out autocorrelation in the error term. 
However, if we allow for an AR(1) process in the error term (Specification 2) or include 
lagged interest income in the fixed effects estimation (Specification 3) or Blundell-Bond 
estimation (not shown here), the result is qualitatively unaffected.
In sum, banks are found to face maturity transformation costs after a monetary 
tightening that reduce their interest income. The existence of this precondition for the 
bank capital channel to be at work strongly supports our argument that the detected 
decline in bank lending by poorly capitalized banks after a monetary tightening is 
indeed due to the bank capital channel.
- Table 3 about here -
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4.3 Should We Care?
Ashcraft (2006) asks the question: “Bank loans might be special, but should 
macroeconomists care?” Microeconometric evidence can only provide a first indication 
of whether the bank capital channel can possibly affect the macro economy. This is only 
the case if loan supply movements are large enough to influence business cycle 
fluctuations.
Therefore, we analyze the size of poorly capitalized banks.19 In terms of loan 
volume (assets), they are, on average, about 2.5 (3) times bigger than their well-
capitalized peers. Thus, in contrast to many studies for the bank lending channel,20 the 
asymmetric reaction of banks is not only driven by very small banks, which are 
potentially irrelevant to the macro economy.
The regression results indicate that banks with a weak interbank liquidity position 
and a high exposure to maturity transformation costs behave most restrictively. For 
simplicity, we assume that the 50 percent of banks with the lowest interbank-liquidity 
buffer and with the largest exposure to maturity transformation costs are well 
represented by the 25th percentile within this subsample. Using the estimated 
coefficients, these banks would react by an average of around 0.2 percentage points
more restrictively than the average bank if we take the most conservative GMM 
estimation and about 0.1 percentage points if we use the fixed effects results.21
After a monetary contraction, following our regression results, we would expect 
those banks that have the most negative values in the interaction of interbank liquidity 
and the most pronounced maturity mismatch between the time-to-maturities of their 
19 Using the same definition as in the dummy approach.
20 See e.g. Frühwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann (2006) for Austria.
21 The fixed effects results are only shown in Merkl and Stolz (2006). If we use a pooled regression, 
we obtain estimated coefficients that are in between the two other coefficients.
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assets and liabilities to react most restrictively. Considering these banks in the sub-
sample reveals that they are somewhat smaller in terms of loan volume than the average 
bank in the sample.
Without wanting to stretch our example too far, we present a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation that illustrates the relevance of the bank capital channel. In 2004, the overall 
loan volume to companies and private clients was about € 2.2 trillion in Germany. We 
assume for simplicity that, of the lower 50 percent capitalized banks, half the banks 
with the smallest interbank liquidity and greatest exposure to maturity transformation 
costs represents roughly about a quarter of the lending volume. Furthermore, we take 
the results from the most conservative estimation, saying that those banks reduce their 
lending by an additional 0.1 percentage point in the long run (compared to their average 
peers) if the interest rate goes up by 1 percentage point. Our back-of-the-envelope 
calculation indicates that those banks would reduce their loan supply by € 600 million 
in the long run.
Even if banks’ customers can replace loans from their “house bank” with other 
sources of finance, they may have to bear considerable switching costs. The numbers 
therefore suggest that the bank capital channel may have significant effects in Germany, 
especially if the loan supply exerts a multiplier effect on real economic activity. A more 
detailed analysis would go beyond the scope of this study and will be left for future 
research. To do so, it would be necessary to analyze the reaction of bank customers to 
such a pattern, i.e. the substitutability of loans.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that the bank capital channel hypothesis is relevant to 
Germany. The outlined framework adds an asset buffer to the existing theory and shows 
its relevance in the empirical regressions. Banks with lower asset and lower capital 
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buffers that face maturity transformation costs react more restrictively to a monetary 
tightening than their average peers.
We find evidence in favour of a statistically and economically significant interaction 
of asset buffer, capital buffer, and maturity transformation costs. The results indicate the 
existence of the bank capital channel. Although the bank lending channel may exist in 
parallel, we are confident that our findings are driven by the bank capital channel. 
However, as no framework to discriminate the two channels exists, we cannot test the 
two channels against one another more rigorously. Hence, future research on developing 
such an analytical framework would be highly desirable.
In terms of affected lending volume, the results are economically significant and 
indicate that the bank capital channel may be an important source of monetary policy 
transmission for Germany. However, the question as to the size of the effects can only 
be answered with more evidence about the substitutability of bank loans that are 
affected by potential reductions in the loan supply after a monetary tightening. 
Furthermore, calibrated dynamic stochastic equilibrium models of the Bernanke et 
al. (1999) type, which could try to incorporate the bank capital channel explicitly, may 
deliver further insights into potential effects. Both issues are surely a major challenge 
for future research.
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Appendix:
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Loan Growth Quarterly growth in domestic loans to non-financial firms and to 
private customers
Risk Yearly new loan-loss provisions and loan write-offs equally 
spread over the four quarters of a year divided by total loans
Capital Buffer Regulatory capital minus risk-weighted assets divided by total 
assets; demeaned by group-year means.
Asset Buffer Interbank claims that are due on demand within one year divided 
by total assets; corrected by group means.
Rho Proxy for the term structure mismatch between assets and 
liabilities. The bigger a positive Rho, the bigger a bank’s maturity 
costs after a monetary tightening.
MP Absolute change in the three-month EURIBOR (=monetary 
policy indicator)
GDP Growth Quarterly real GDP growth
Volatility Intra-quarterly volatility of the three-month EURIBOR. The 
numbers are derived from daily data.
High Dummy variable that is unity if the bank’s average capitalization 
is above the median excess capitalization in the sample and zero 
otherwise.
Low Dummy variable that is unity if the bank’s average capitalization 
is below the median excess capitalization in the sample and zero 
otherwise.
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Notes: The bank-specific variables come from a confidential supervisory dataset kindly 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, while the macroeconomic variables were 
obtained from the International Financial Statistics from the International Monetary 
Fund. The numbers on daily Euribor fluctuations were obtained from Datastream.
Rho is a proxy for the cost a bank faces after a monetary tightening by the central 
bank due to the maturity transformation and is calculated as follows:
jA  and jP  are assets and liabilities classes with different time-to-maturity. The 
Deutsche Bundesbank’s prudential database contains six maturity classes.22 The 
sensitivities ( j and j ) are obtained directly from the supervisory regulations.23 We 
divided by the average size of interest-bearing assets and liabilities to normalize for the 
size of a bank.
In order to determine the existence of a bank capital channel, it is necessary to 
consider the change in a bank’s profits due to a change in the interest rate. We therefore 
need to take into account all interest-bearing assets and liabilities rather than those 
merely existing in the trading portfolio. The extent to which a bank is exposed to 
interest rate changes is dependent on the degree of maturity mismatch held by the bank.
22 Interest-bearing assets and liabilities with time-to-maturity shorter than one year, 
one to two years, two to three years, three to four years, four to five years, and 
above five years.
23 The Amendment to the Basel Accord to Incorporate Market Risks, Basle 
Committee, January 1996. Since these maturity classes are more detailed, we had 
to use averages for the available maturity classes.
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Since the regulatory data (maturity classes and risk) is only available on a yearly 
basis, we interpolated it linearly to obtain quarterly data.
A positive Rho indicates maturity transformation costs. As can be seen in the chart 
below, these costs are faced by most German banks.
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A more detailed description of the variables can be found in Merkl and Stolz (2006).
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Tables:
Table 1: Long-Term Coefficients for Estimating Equation (1)—Blundell-Bond
(1) (2)
Baseline BaselineDependent Variable:
Loan Growth Without Macro Variables With Macro Variables
Risk -4.57*** -4.65***
(-13.48) (-11.60)
Capital Buffer -0.03 -0.02
(-1.16) (-0.80)
Interbank Liquidity (IL) 0.00 0.00
(0.70) (0.06)
Capital Buffer*Rho*MP 0.20 -0.16
(0.32) (-0.20)
IL * Rho * MP 0.39** 0.27
(2.30) (1.33)
Capital Buffer * IL* Rho * MP -0.43*** -0.46***
(-3.01) (-2.70)
Rho * MP -1.74 -4.39
(-0.82) (-0.78)
MP -0.47
(-0.62)
GDP Growth 1.86***
(8.83)
Time Dummies Yes No
# Obs. (Banks) 26666 (2263) 26666 (2263)
Hansen Test 1.000 0.000***
AR(1) 0.000*** 0.000***
AR(2) 0.825 0.909
Notes: The table gives the long-term coefficients based on Blundell-Bond two-step estimations with 
Windmeijer corrections of equation (1). The dependent variable is Loan Growth, measured as the 
quarterly growth rate of domestic loans to non-financial firms and to private customers. Risk is defined as 
new loan loss provisions plus loan write-offs divided by total loans. Capital Buffer is defined as 
regulatory capital minus risk-weighted assets divided by total assets. Asset Buffer is defined as short-term 
interbank claims divided by total assets. Rho is a proxy for the maturity transformation cost a bank faces 
after a one-percentage-point increase in the monetary policy indicator. MP is defined as the absolute 
change in the three-month EURIBOR (=monetary policy indicator). GDP Growth is defined as quarterly 
growth rate of real GDP. For better readability of the table, the estimated coefficients for Rho* MP are 
rescaled by the factor 10-2, Capital Buffer * Rho* MP and Interbank Liquidity * Rho * MP by 10-4 and 
Capital Buffer * Interbank Liquidity * Rho* MP by 10-6. t-statistics are given in brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test. 
Hansen test refers to the test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) test refer to the test for the 
null of no first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. For the Hansen, 
the AR(1), and the AR(2) tests, p-values are shown.
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Table 2: Long-Term Coefficients for Estimating Equation (2)—Blundell-Bond
(1) (2) (3)
Dummies Dummies Dummies
Dependent Variable:
Loan Growth
Without Macro 
Variables
With Macro 
Variables
With Macro 
Variables (incl. 
Volatility)
Risk -4.31*** -4.58*** -4.38***
(-13.15) (-11.80) (-11.43)
Interbank Liquidity (IL)*Low -0.01 -0.01 -0.04
(-1.09) (-0.96) (-1.73)
Interbank Liquidity*High 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(1.49) (0.21) (-0.74)
IL*Volatility*Low 0.18
(1.44)
IL*Volatility*High 0.09
(0.73)
IL*Rho*MP*Low 0.56** 0.75** 0.77**
(2.09) (2.10) (2.36)
IL*Rho*MP*High 0.02 0.01 -0.09
(0.07) (0.02) (-0.31)
Rho*MP*Low -2.77 -2.83 -8.44
(-0.96) (-0.41) (-1.36)
Rho*MP*High -4.29 -5.49 -10.37
(-1.59) (-0.83) (-1.70)
MP -0.42 -2.01**
(-0.47) (-2.26)
GDP Growth 1.74*** 4.36***
(8.14) (10.54)
Volatility -4.63***
(-6.35)
Time Dummies Yes No No
# Obs. (Banks) 26671 (2263) 26671 (2263) 26671 (2263)
Hansen Test 1.000 0.255 1.000
AR(1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
AR(2) 0.882 0.658 0.575
Notes: The table gives the long-term coefficients based on Blundell-Bond two-step estimations with 
Windmeijer corrections of equation (2). Volatility is measured as intra-quarterly volatility of the three-
month EURIBOR based on daily data. For the other variable definitions, see Table 1. To improve the 
readability of the table, the estimated coefficients for Rho*MP are rescaled by the factor 10-2, Capital 
Buffer*Rho* MP and Interbank Liquidity*Rho*MP by 10-4, Capital Buffer*Interbank 
Liquidity*Rho*MP by 10-6, Volatility by 104, and Interbank Liquidity*Volatility by 102. t-statistics are 
given in brackets. For savings banks, we use only three lags of the endogenous variables, since this is 
sufficient to capture the dynamics. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test. Hansen test refers to the test of overidentifying 
restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) test refer to the test for the null of no first-order and second-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. For the Hansen, the AR(1), and the AR(2) tests, p-values 
are shown.
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Table 3: Fixed-Effects Estimations, 1999-2004
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: 
Interest Incomet
Robust Standard 
Errors
AR(1) Standard 
Errors
Robust Standard 
Errors
Interest Incomet-1 -0.00
(0.09)
Rhot*MPt -0.35 -0.18* -0.35
(1.31) (1.84) (1.31)
Rhot-1*MPt-1 -1.14*** -0.56*** -1.14***
(4.61) (5.84) (4.61)
Constant 0.05*** -0.01*** 0.05***
(117.88) (4.07) (117.87)
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. (Banks) 11877 (2742) 9135 (2432) 11877 (2742)
Notes: The table gives the coefficients based on fixed effects estimation. The dependent variable is Net 
Interest Income, measured as net interest income divided by the average of fixed-interest-bearing assets 
and liabilities. Rho is a proxy for the maturity transformation cost a bank faces after a one-percentage-
point increase in the monetary policy indicator. MPi is defined as the absolute change in the three-month 
EURIBOR (=monetary policy indicator). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed t-test.
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